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#### AFRICOM counterterror operations have skyrocketed over the past decade yet the threat from terrorism continues to grow.

#### This proves our policies, as demonstrated by the basing agreement with Djibouti, doesn’t solve and contributes to massive militarization across the continent

Nick TURSE, historian, essayist, investigative journalist, the associate editor of TomDispatch.com, and currently a fellow at Harvard University's Radcliffe Institute, 15 [“Military Missions Reach Record Levels After US Inks Deal to Remain in Africa for Decades,” *Truthout*, April 15, 2015, <http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/30194-military-missions-reach-record-levels-after-us-inks-deal-to-remain-in-africa-for-decades>] \*numbers turned to text and acronyms added by Viveth Karthikeyan.

In recent years, the U.S. has been involved in a variety of multinational interventions in Africa, including one in Libya that involved both a secret war and a conventional campaign of missiles and air strikes, assistance to French forces in the Central African Republic and Mali, and the training and funding of African proxies to do battle against militant groups like Boko Haram as well as Somalia’s al-Shabab and Mali’s Ansar al-Dine. In 2014, the U.S. carried out [six hundred seventy-four] 674 military activities across Africa, nearly two missions per day, an almost [three hundred percent] 300% jump in the number of annual operations, exercises, and military-to-military training activities since U.S. Africa Command (AFRICOM) was established in 2008.

Despite this massive increase in missions and a similar swelling of bases, personnel, and funding, the picture painted last month before the Senate Armed Services Committee by AFRICOM chief General David Rodriguez was startlingly bleak. For all the American efforts across Africa, Rodriguez offered a vision of a continent in crisis, imperiled from East to West by militant groups that have developed, grown in strength, or increased their deadly reach in the face of U.S. counterterrorism efforts.

“Transregional terrorists and criminal networks continue to adapt and expand aggressively,” Rodriguez told committee members. “Al-Shabab has broadened its operations to conduct, or attempt to conduct, asymmetric attacks against Uganda, Ethiopia, Djibouti, and especially Kenya. Libya-based threats are growing rapidly, including an expanding ISIL presence... Boko Haram threatens the ability of the Nigerian government to provide security and basic services in large portions of the northeast.” Despite the grim outcomes since the American military began “pivoting” to Africa after 9/11, the U.S. recently signed an agreement designed to keep its troops based on the continent until almost midcentury.

Mission Creep

For years, the U.S. military has publicly insisted that its efforts in Africa are negligible, intentionally leaving the American people, not to mention most Africans, in the dark about the true size, scale, and scope of its operations there. AFRICOM public affairs personnel and commanders have repeatedly claimed no more than a “light footprint” on the continent. They shrink from talk of camps and outposts, claiming to have just one base anywhere in Africa: Camp Lemonnier in the tiny nation of Djibouti. They don’t like to talk about military operations. They offer detailed information about only a tiny fraction of their training exercises. They refuse to disclose the locations where personnel have been stationed or even counts of the countries involved.

During an interview, an AFRICOM spokesman once expressed his worry to me that even tabulating how many deployments the command has in Africa would offer a “skewed image” of U.S. efforts. Behind closed doors, however, AFRICOM’s officers speak quite a different language. They have repeatedly asserted that the continent is an American “battlefield” and that -- make no bones about it -- they are already embroiled in an actual “war.”

According to recently released figures from U.S. Africa Command, the scope of that “war” grew dramatically in 2014. In its “posture statement,” AFRICOM reports that it conducted 68 operations last year, up from 55 the year before. These included operations Juniper Micron and Echo Casemate, missions focused on aiding French and African interventions in Mali and the Central African Republic; Observant Compass, an effort to degrade or destroy what’s left of Joseph Kony’s murderous Lord’s Resistance Army in central Africa; and United Assistance, the deployment of military personnel to combat the Ebola crisis in West Africa.

The number of major joint field exercises U.S. personnel engaged in with African military partners inched up from 10 in 2013 to 11 last year. These included African Lion in Morocco, Western Accord in Senegal, Central Accord in Cameroon, and Southern Accord in Malawi, all of which had a field training component and served as capstone events for the prior year’s military-to-military instruction missions.

AFRICOM also conducted maritime security exercises including Obangame Express in the Gulf of Guinea, Saharan Express in the waters off Senegal, and three weeks of maritime security training scenarios as part of Phoenix Express 2014, with sailors from numerous countries including Algeria, Italy, Libya, Malta, Morocco, Tunisia, and Turkey.

The number of security cooperation activities skyrocketed from 481 in 2013 to 595 last year. Such efforts included military training under a “state partnership program” that teams African military forces with U.S. National Guard units and the State Department-funded Africa Contingency Operations Training and Assistance, or ACOTA, program through which U.S. military advisers and mentors provide equipment and instruction to African troops.

In 2013, the combined total of all U.S. activities on the continent reached 546, an average of more than one mission per day. Last year, that number leapt to 674. In other words, U.S. troops were carrying out almost two operations, exercises, or activities -- from drone strikes to counterinsurgency instruction, intelligence gathering to marksmanship training -- somewhere in Africa every day. This represents an enormous increase from the 172 “missions, activities, programs, and exercises” that AFRICOM inherited from other geographic commands when it began operations in 2008.

Transnational Terror Groups: Something From Nothing

In 2000, a report prepared under the auspices of the U.S. Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute examined the “African security environment.” While it touched on “internal separatist or rebel movements” in “weak states,” as well as non-state actors like militias and “warlord armies,” there was conspicuously no mention of Islamic extremism or major transnational terrorist threats. Prior to 2001, in fact, the United States did not recognize any terrorist organizations in sub-Saharan Africa and a senior Pentagon official noted that the most feared Islamic militants on the continent had “not engaged in acts of terrorism outside Somalia.”

In the wake of 9/11, even before AFRICOM was created, the U.S. began ramping up operations across the continent in an effort to bolster the counterterror capabilities of allies and insulate Africa from transnational terror groups, namely globe-trotting Islamic extremists. The continent, in other words, was seen as something of a clean slate for experiments in terror prevention.

Billions of dollars have been pumped into Africa to build bases, arm allies, gather intelligence, fight proxy wars, assassinate militants, and conduct perhaps thousands of military missions -- and none of it has had its intended effect. Last year, for example, Somali militants “either planned or executed increasingly complex and lethal attacks in Somalia, Kenya, Uganda, Djibouti, and Ethiopia,” according to AFRICOM. Earlier this month, those same al-Shabab militants upped the ante by slaughtering 142 students at a college in Kenya.

And al-Shabab’s deadly growth and spread has hardly been the exception to the rule in Africa. In recent testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, AFRICOM commander Rodriguez rattled off the names of numerous Islamic terror groups that have sprung up in the intervening years, destabilizing the very countries the U.S. had sought to strengthen. While the posture statement he presented put the best gloss possible on Washington’s military efforts in Africa, even a cursory reading of it -- and under the circumstances, it’s worth quoting at length -- paints a bleak picture of what that “pivot” to Africa has actually meant on the ground. Sections pulled from various parts of the document speak volumes:

“The network of al-Qaeda and its affiliates and adherents continues to exploit Africa’s under-governed regions and porous borders to train and conduct attacks. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is expanding its presence in North Africa. Terrorists with allegiances to multiple groups are expanding their collaboration in recruitment, financing, training, and operations, both within Africa and trans-regionally. Violent extremist organizations are utilizing increasingly sophisticated improvised explosive devices, and casualties from these weapons in Africa increased by approximately 40 percent in 2014...

“In North and West Africa, Libyan and Nigerian insecurity increasingly threaten U.S. interests. In spite of multinational security efforts, terrorist and criminal networks are gaining strength and interoperability. [AQIM] Al-Qaeda in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb, Ansar al-Sharia, al-Murabitun, Boko Haram, the [ISIL] Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant, and other violent extremist organizations are exploiting weak governance, corrupt leadership, and porous borders across the Sahel and Maghreb to train and move fighters and distribute resources...

“Libya-based threats to U.S. interests are growing… Libyan governance, security, and economic stability deteriorated significantly in the past year… Today, armed groups control large areas of territory in Libya and operate with impunity. Libya appears to be emerging as a safe haven where terrorists, including al-Qaeda and Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-affiliated groups, can train and rebuild with impunity. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant is increasingly active in Libya, including in Derna, Benghazi, Tripoli, and Sebha...

“The spillover effects of instability in Libya and northern Mali increase risks to U.S. interests in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa, including the success of Tunisia’s democratic transition...

“The security situation in Nigeria also declined in the past year. Boko Haram threatens the functioning of a government that is challenged to maintain its people’s trust and to provide security and other basic services… Boko Haram has launched attacks across Nigeria’s borders into Cameroon, Chad, and Niger...

“...both the Central African Republic and Democratic Republic of the Congo are at risk of further destabilization by insurgent groups, and simmering ethnic tensions in the Great Lakes region have the potential to boil over violently in the Democratic Republic of the Congo.”

All this, mind you, is AFRICOM’s own assessment of the situation on the continent on which it has focused its efforts for the better part of a decade as U.S. missions there soared. In this context, it’s worth reemphasizing that, before the U.S. ramped up those efforts, Africa was -- by Washington’s own estimation -- relatively free of transnational Islamic terror groups.

Tipping the Scales in Africa

Despite Boko Haram’s pledge of allegiance to the Islamic State and scare headlines lamenting their merger or conflating those or other brutal terror outfits operating under similar monikers, there is currently no real Islamic State of Africa. But the war game carried out at MacDill Air Force Base in January against that fictional group is far from fantasy, representing as it does the next logical step in a series of operations that have been gaining steam since AFRICOM’s birth. And buried in the command’s 2015 Posture Statement is actual news that signals a continuation of this trajectory into the 2040s.

In May 2014, the U.S. reached an agreement -- it’s called an “implementing arrangement” -- with the government of Djibouti “that secures [its] presence” in that country “through 2044.” In addition, AFRICOM officers are now talking about the possibility of building a string of surveillance outposts along the northern tier of the continent. And don’t forget how, over the past few years, U.S. staging areas, mini-bases, and airfields have popped up in the contiguous nations of Senegal, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, and -- skipping Chad (where AFRICOM recently built temporary facilities for a special ops exercise) -- the Central African Republic, South Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. All of this suggests that the U.S. military is digging in for the long haul in Africa.

Silent Quest 15-1 was designed as a model to demonstrate just how Washington will conduct “Special Operations-centric” coalition warfare in Africa. It was, in fact, designed to align, wrote Gunnery Sergeant Reina Barnett in SOCOM’s trade publication Tip of the Spear, with the “2020 planning guidance of Army Maj. Gen. James Linder, commander of Special Operations Command Africa.” And the agreement with Djibouti demonstrates that the U.S. military is now beginning to plan for almost a quarter-century beyond that. But, if the last six years -- marked by a 300% increase in U.S. missions as well as the spread of terror groups and terrorism in Africa -- are any indicator, the results are likely to be anything but pleasing to Washington.

AFRICOM commander David Rodriguez continues to put the best face on U.S. efforts in Africa, citing “progress in several areas through close cooperation with our allies and partners.” His command’s assessment of the situation, however, is remarkably bleak. “Where our national interests compel us to tip the scales and enhance collective security gains, we may have to do more -- either by enabling our allies and partners, or acting unilaterally,” reads the posture statement Rodriguez delivered to that Senate committee.

After more than a decade of increasing efforts, however, there’s little evidence that AFRICOM has the slightest idea how to tip the scales in its own favor in Africa.

#### This military strategy is premised on total pre-emption of all threats to stability. This has required a mobilization of U.S. academies to produce social sciences oriented around training future counterinsurgents.

-To fulfill this task, the Pentagon created ties w/ American universities to mobilize social science education to train future counterinsurgents—we now engage in shit like psy-ops

Horace CAMPBELL, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, AND Amber MURREY, PhD student in the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford, 14 [“Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US Africa Command: assessing the role of the US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, Issue 8, 2014, p. 1457-1475, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

The obscurity of the discourse on insecurity and terrorism, along with the intimate relationship between militarism and capital accumulation, have serious connotations for social science researchers involved in military efforts to expand intelligence, such as for Africom. In full-spectrum domination the emphasis is on military readiness, prevention and the employment of strategic cultural knowledge to destroy the enemy before s/he comes into being. The push for ever-more preventive interventions is based on the notion that the most effective way to win is to prevent, on your terms, the enemy from ever becoming an enemy. This can only occur through precise, accurate and intimate knowledge of the potential enemy’s culture, socio-politics and psychology: in effect, only by totally dominating every aspect of the potential enemy’s being. Hence, the US military doctrine of ‘full-spectrum domination’.

In full-spectrum dominance the aim is ‘to control the very force of becoming [a terrorist and all that is conflated within the rubric of ‘security threat’, including revolutionaries] by shaping an “environment” of [supposedly potential] insurgent formation. The promise of environmental control is that an enemy can be beaten before s/he has even become an enemy.’52 The June 2011 Congressional report on US Africa Command reads, ‘Defense strategy is now evolving to look at conflict prevention, or “Phase Zero”’: an attempt to engage with ‘threats at their inception’. The acquisition and synthesis of cultural knowledge creates the basis for the ‘information superiority’ that allows for ‘dominant maneuver[s]’, ‘precision engagement’, ‘focused logistics’ and ‘full dimensional projection[s]’ that are key to its Joint Vision 2020 of pre-emptive counterinsurgency.53

These approaches are not novel. Military strategists have long been interested in understanding an enemy’s society and culture as a means of anticipating and controlling military engagements; this has been especially true in the case of asymmetrical warfare. They harken back to the work of the military officers engaged in the efforts to suppress anti-colonial movements in the 1950s in Africa and Asia. The pre-emptive counterinsurgency style is what French military scholar David Galula called ‘cold revolutionary war’,54 and what British counterinsurgency scholar Frank Kitson referred to as the ‘preparatory period’ before anti-colonial movements even began to organise.55 Contemporary US counterinsurgents and officials at the US Africa Command have adopted similar notions of anticipation and preparation so that ‘the defining conflict of American international relations…[has gone from] engaging and containing opponents to ensuring there cannot possibly be any opponents’.56

The first task of full-spectrum Phase Zero operations is the systematic collection and employment of (potential) enemy intelligence. In an article for Proceedings in 2004 Major General Robert H Scales Jr, US Army (Retired), wrote of Operation Iraqi Freedom, ‘Consensus seems to be building among [returned soldiers] that this conflict was fought brilliantly at the technological level but inadequately at the human level. The human element seems to underlie virtually all the functional shortcomings chronicled in official reports and media stories.’57 These remarks underscore a shift that has occurred in US military engagement since late 2003: a ‘culture-centric warfare’ in which the knowledge of an enemy’s social and cultural behaviour, beliefs, motivations and methodologies is viewed as increasingly essential to determining military strategy.58

Pentagon officials, government representatives and pundits have embraced this culturally insightful form of US counterinsurgency, one that is concerned with ‘mapping’ and controlling ‘human terrain’ through nuanced cultural knowledge. ‘Human terrain’ refers to strategically mapping the features and dimensions of human groups for the purposes of determining the nature of military engagements.59 Roberto González (2009) traces the roots of this language to a report from the US House on Un-American Activities Committee, in which the Black Panther Party was believed to ‘possess the ability to seize and retain the initiative through a superior control of the human terrain’.60 Human mapping incorporates another counterrevolutionary principal proposed by Galula: the population is both a battlefield and a weapon.61

A second aspect of Phase Zero operations is the ‘capacity building of allies’, or actions taken to bolster popular opinion in favour of US policy through psy-ops (modern psychological warfare) and propaganda campaigns.62 Galula identifies one strategic concern of counterinsurgency as the ability to ‘find the favorable minority, [and, particularly during the ‘Phase Zero’ or ‘cold revolution’ operations] to organize it in order to mobilize the population against the insurgent minority’.63 Likewise, Kitson devoted a chapter in his book, Low-Intensity Warfare, to the analysis of the preparatory period before the development of an insurgency group. During this preparatory period the ruling party carefully plans and coordinates ‘an efficient intelligence organization’ capable of ‘psychological operations’ in order to ‘organize the populations’ in support of the regime in power.64 US military strategists continue to draw from these ideas through practices of ‘winning the hearts and minds’.

In The Insurgents, Fred Kaplan describes the role played by the social scientists who graduated from the Department of Social Science at West Point, the prestigious US military academy, in further entrenching the relationship between the US military and US academies. After the failure of US counterinsurgency in Vietnam, Colonel Huba Wass de Czege – who served two tours as an infantry officer in Vietnam and who was primarily responsible for the military strategy that preceded Full Spectrum Operations (known as AirLand Battle) – worked to integrate top military brass (ie officers) with Ivy League institutions. The ostensible reason was to train and shape top US officer ‘judgement’. In The Generals: American Military Command from World War II to Today, Tom Ricks devotes an entire chapter to what he termed ‘Teaching Judgement’, ie how to influence the judgement of US military officers. According to this understanding of the history of the US military, before Vietnam the military depended on hardware and sophisticated equipment but did not know how to think. De Czege set out to teach officers ‘how to think’ as opposed to ‘only what to think about war.’65

For de Czege there was an intellectual gap in the military’s understanding of how to go to war. Linking up with top universities, he thought, would allow the military to tap into the thinking capabilities of the US university system; it would also ensure that all senior officers would have at least a masters degree from the top-ranked universities. To these ends, de Czege founded and directed the School of Advanced Military Studies (sams). To be eligible to enter sams, officers have to go through social science training in Ivy League universities such as Stanford or Princeton. After going through these top-ranked universities, the senior officers learn the counterinsurgency doctrines of Galula and Kitson and it was anticipated that the graduates would have a tremendous impact on the military by 2000. Indeed, sams became the networking base for the new coin and social science thinking and General Schwarzkopf brought in 82 graduates from sams for the first Gulf War, while General Tommy Franks mobilised other sams experts for the US invasion of Iraq in 2003.66

Retired US General David Petraeus, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency and former Commander of US Forces Afghanistan was similarly convinced that there should be close integration between the military and the academy. As a senior officer Petraeus earned a Masters of Public Administration (MPA) (in 1985) and a PhD degree in International Relations (in 1987) from the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. He later served as Assistant Professor of International Relations at the United States Military Academy and completed a fellowship at Georgetown University. Petraeus later completed the coin manual at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, KA. David John Kilcullen, David Petraeus, John Nagl, Kavlev Sepp, Steven Metz and Eliot Cohen have since joined the pantheon of unsuccessful counterinsurgency specialists in the West (including Galula and Kitson), who failed in an earlier generation to halt self-determination projects in formerly colonised societies.67

In 2003 Pentagon officials and the former Secretary of State, Donald Rumsfeld, laid out a contemporary brand of psychological warfare operations (‘psy-ops’) under the rubric of an Information Operations Roadmap. The roadmap identifies effective psy-ops as that those that ‘directly influence [foreign] decision-making’.68 The Information Operations Roadmap is one component of ‘full spectrum dominance’, which entails psychological warfare, special operations, electronic warfare (ew or ‘fight the net’, which is warfare on internet production) and involvement in foreign journalism, for the purposes of mobilising a ‘favourable minority’ to speak on behalf of US national interests. The processes categorically outlined in the psy-ops document require a sophisticated level of intellectual competence, mobilising the US social sciences for information collection and on-the-ground support within the rubric of US Africom psy-ops.

#### This counterterror paradigm creates a cognitive frame that prioritizes pre-emption at all costs. Not only does this cause structural violence, but also it ignores the deeper causes of terrorism.

Richard JACKSON, professor of peace studies at the National Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of Otago, New Zealand, 15 [“The epistemological crisis of counterterrorism,” *Critical Studies on Terrorism*, Volume 8, Issue 1, 2015, p. 33-54, Accessed Online through MSU Libraries]

The consequences of counterterrorism’s epistemological crisis

The significance of the epistemological crisis lies primarily in its consequences for counterterrorism thought and practice – which are inextricably bound together and inseparable, in any case. That is, the epistemological crisis can be understood as generative of certain kinds of thinking, actions and practices. As Daase and Kessler (2007, 412) describe the process by which contemporary understandings of terrorism construct the basis for action: “It is the relationship between what we know, what we do not know, what we cannot know and what we do not like to know that determines the cognitive frame for political practice.” Or, as Zulaika (2012, 58) quoting Merton notes: “If men (sic) define situations as real, they are real in their consequences” (1968, 475). Once the premises of the epistemological crisis have been accepted as true, and especially once they have been institutionalised and internalised, they then form the logic or cognitive frame for action. From another perspective, it can be argued that, once accepted and institutionalised, the epistemological crisis acts as a kind of policy paradigm, forming a central part of the “elite assumptions that constrain the cognitive range of useful solutions available to policy makers” (Campbell 1998b, 385).

Crucially, the epistemological crisis is not about individual or collective negligence or the personal failures of counterterrorist officials; those in charge of preventing terrorism are likely to be genuinely concerned, responsible individuals acting in what they perceive to be the best interests of society (Zulaika 2012, 52). Rather, counterterrorist failings and abuses are the result of the broader epistemic structures and conditions – the policy paradigm – under which officials are forced to think and act.

Apart from the trillions of dollars and millions of people in the “security-industrial complex” who are currently invested in preventing the coming terror (see Zulaika 2012, 51; Baker-Beall and Robinson 2014), the first and most obvious consequences of the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism are all the fantasy-infused security practices and postures discussed earlier, as well as the extensive programmes of security theatre enacted at airports and elsewhere, the institutionalisation of the state of exception, and socially disciplinary practices such as mass surveillance, control orders, counter-radicalisation programmes, resilience initiatives and the like. Zulaika (2009, 18) argues that contemporary counterterrorism represents a form of thinking that resembles “the mental world of medieval witchcraft and inquisitorial nonsense”. Considering some of the magical realist thinking inherent in contemporary counter-radicalisation programmes (see also Heath-Kelly 2012a), including the official expression of notions of pre-crime, the concept of “risky citizens”, efforts to control words and images considered to be capable of infection, and more, such an assessment is entirely apposite.

Another obvious and related consequence of the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is the institutionalisation and sedimentation of a politics of fear (see Jackson 2013, 2007). In an atmosphere of permanently “waiting for terror” and moral panic, threat levels are raised and lowered by officials, often on the basis of fantastical projection rather than hard evidence, and public fear is manipulated for electoral gain and the promotion of non-terrorism-related political projects. In the process, the interplay of knowledge and ignorance transforms a public fear of terrorism into a general and permanent epistemic fear (Zulaika and Douglass 1996), one which can be easily manipulated for political gain. From this perspective, the epistemological crisis of counterterrorism is functional to political elites who can manipulate uncertainty and the underlying logic of the crisis for direct political and material gain.

A third predictable consequence of the epistemological crisis in terms of risk management and preemption are the well-documented and highly destructive counterterrorist practices of preemptive war, the use of drones to kill terrorist suspects, torture and rendition, control orders and mass surveillance. For example, given that we cannot know for certain who the terrorist is, only that they certainly exist and are plotting mass destruction, and that we cannot take the risk that inaction will allow them to complete their mission, it makes perfect sense to include as many people as possible on any terrorist watch list. It is now known that in the United States, “More than one million names are included on secret lists of suspected terrorists maintained by the Obama administration”. While “people on the list are likely to be subject to enhanced surveillance”, not surprisingly in the context of the epistemological crisis, “almost half of the people on a key government list don’t have known ties to any specific terrorist organisation” (Lee 2014; emphasis added). Given the way that uncertainty and the unknown nevertheless create an imperative to act preemptively, it is perhaps surprising that many more people are not on the secret list. Of course, the reason for this is likely to be that virtually everyone is under surveillance anyway, as the Edward Snowden revelations demonstrate.

A fourth consequence of the epistemological crisis is the many “false positives” (Heath-Kelly 2012a) produced by the moral imperative to act, even if “it turns out to be wrong”. Here we can note the hundreds of thousands of people killed in the invasion of Iraq aimed at preempting the “world’s most dangerous regimes… [from] threaten[ing] us with the world’s most destructive weapons”, as George Bush famously argued. Similarly, thousands of others have been rendered, detained, imprisoned, tortured, assassinated in drone strikes, or like Jean Charles de Menezes, shot to death in domestic counterterrorist operations. In each case, the moral imperative to act preemptively overwhelmed any caution which might have been engendered by uncertainty or lack of knowledge. Official calculations under the conditions of the epistemological crisis state that it is better to act than not act, even if it turns out to be wrong and leaves innocent people dead or injured. Similar logic applies to the greatly enhanced security measures across society, mass surveillance, de-radicalisation programmes, control orders, and the like, as well as efforts to curtail opposition and dissent in all forms, in case it proves to be the work of terrorists. Knowing that there are terrorists in our midst, but not knowing who they are or what they are planning, we are bound to watch everyone, detain anyone, secure everything, preempt attacks and prevent terrorist intentions from emerging in the first place.

Another consequence of the epistemological crisis is that the symptoms – or the “signs of future threat”, as Martin (2014) puts it – rather than the deeper roots or causes of terrorism become the primary focus of action.6 That is, preventing the inevitable coming attacks becomes the main objective of counterterrorism, rather than the prevention of the circumstances and conditions that lead to terrorism in the first instance (Frank 2014, 333). This is both a consequence and cause of the taboo which prevents direct knowledge of terrorist subjectivity. It is also the result of rendering previous knowledge about terrorist behaviour obsolete, the fatalism of accepting that terrorism will occur whatever actions are taken, and the processes of knowledge subjugation about the kind of policies and circumstances which give rise to terrorism in the first place. In any case, counterterrorism efforts have become fixated on the anticipation of imagined future plots, rather than focused on the current actual threat and its causes (Mueller 2006).

Finally, the epistemological crisis precludes the possibility of the rational evaluation or cost-benefit analysis and assessment, of counterterrorist policies (Mueller and Stewart 2011), and acts to pacify dissent and opposition to state security programmes. Instead, in a context bound by anti-knowledge and the unknown, speculation, imagination and counter-factual, unprovable knowledge becomes a substitute form of assessment, and the (non)victims of terrorist attacks that never occurred (but could have) are counted as evidence of success:

Fighting terror is like fighting car accidents: one can count the casualties but not those whose lives were spared by prevention. Hundreds, if not thousands, of Israelis go about their lives without knowing that they are unhurt because their murderers met their fate before they got the chance to carry out their diabolical missions. This silent multitude is the testament to the policy’s success. (Luft 2003, 3)

Clearly, within such a paradigm, evidence-based reform and refinement of counterterrorist policy is unnecessary and illogical in any case. This means that mistakes tend to recur and lessons cannot be learned.

#### Specifically, drone warfare is fueling further high-tech military violence. Signature strikes in particular are destroying communities in Yemen and Somalia without addressing the underlying reasons for insurgent organizations to exist.

-Signature strikes kill people without knowing their identity

-This perpetuates U.S. militarism—alternate ways of approaching terrorism, like diplomacy, that are more effective are overlooked—ties in well w/ our epistemology indicts from Jackson, also cites a RAND study

-High tech violence sustains permanent militarism by making it seem more precise

Adam HUDSON, a reporting fellow at *Truthout*, typically covering national security issues, Guantánamo, human rights, gentrification and policing, 15 [“Thanks to Reliance on "Signature" Drone Strikes, US Military Doesn't Know Who It's Killing,” *Truthout*, August 4, 2015, http://www.truth-out.org/news/item/32166-thanks-to-reliance-on-signature-drone-strikes-us-military-doesn-t-know-who-it-s-killing# (Edited for Gendered Language – Sigalos)]

Last month, on June 9, the United States launched a drone strike that killed Nasir al-Wuhayshi, a high-ranking leader in the Islamic militant group al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). What makes the strike notable is that it was a coincidence: The CIA - the agency that pulled the trigger - had no idea al-Wuhayshi was among the group of suspected militants it targeted. Al-Wuhayshi's death at the hands of a US drone reveals that the United States continues to fire drone missiles at people whose identities it does not know.

Government officials confirmed the June 9 strike was a "signature strike" to The Washington Post. A signature strike takes place when a drone hits a target based on a target's patterns of behavior, but without knowing that target's identity. Thus, a US drone, in a signature strike, will target an area the government believes is filled with militant activity but will not know who exactly they are killing. While signature strikes have been happening for a while in the global war on terror, they signify a serious shift in US war-making. American warfare is increasingly placing a greater emphasis on big data, advanced computing, [unstaffed] systems and cyberwarfare. While this approach may seem "cleaner" and more precise than previous tactics (particularly in contrast the drawn-out and bloody occupations of Iraq and Afghanistan), it is not. High-tech militarism is far from "accurate." Even more importantly, it inflicts serious human suffering and perpetuates the US permanent-war machine.

Signature Strikes

Signature strikes began during the Bush years, in January 2008, as the US intensified drone strikes in Pakistan. When Obama entered office in 2009, his administration picked up where Bush left off and exponentially increased the number of drone strikes. During his eight years in office, Bush launched 51 drone strikes in Pakistan and killed between 410 and 595 people. Obama, so far, has launched 419 drone strikes in Pakistan, alone, and killed over 4,500 people in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia since 2009.

When a drone strike takes place, the US government "counts all military-aged males in a strike zone as combatant" unless posthumous intelligence proves them innocent, according to a May 2012 New York Times report. A White House fact sheet says this is "not the case." However, that contradicts what government officials leaked to the media outlets like The New York Times and ProPublica. As the Times report notes, "Counterterrorism officials insist this approach is one of simple logic: People in an area of known terrorist activity, or found with a top Qaeda operative, are probably up to no good."

In fact, US drone strikes have killed teenagers in countries like Pakistan and Yemen. One example is 16-year-old US citizen Abdulrahman al-Awlaki (son of Islamic militant preacher Anwar al-Awlaki, also a US citizen killed in a US drone strike) in 2011. Then-Attorney General Eric Holder said Abdulrahman was not ''specifically targeted.'' Another is Mohammed Tuaiman, a 13-year-old Yemeni boy who was killed by a CIA drone strike in Yemen last February. Drones had killed his brother and father beforehand.

Some State Department officials complained to the White House that the CIA's criteria for signature strikes was "too lax," according to The New York Times report. "The joke was that when the C.I.A. sees 'three guys doing jumping jacks,' the agency thinks it is a terrorist training camp, said one senior official. Men loading a truck with fertilizer could be bomb makers - but they might also be farmers, skeptics argued," the report says.

Drone strikes are launched by the CIA and the US military's Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), an elite military unit that carries out specialized, risky missions - or "special operations" - such as manhunts, "targeted killings" and rescues. Underneath JSOC's umbrella are special mission units that directly perform the operations. Those units include the Army's Delta Force, the Air Force's 24th Special Tactics Squadron and the Navy's SEAL Team Six, which killed Osama bin Laden in 2011.

The CIA has a similar paramilitary unit, known as the Special Operations Group (SOG). SOG operates under the CIA's Special Activities Division - the division that carries out covert operations - and often selects operatives from JSOC. JSOC's activities are distinct from conventional troops in the US Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps. The US Special Operations Command (SOCOM) oversees JSOC and all special operations units within every military branch. JSOC also answers directly to the executive branch, with little to no oversight from Congress. Its missions are secret. The CIA is subject to some congressional oversight but still largely answers to the executive branch. This means JSOC and the CIA's paramilitary unit are virtually the president's private armies.

The CIA has no drone bases in Yemen, but flies drones out of bases in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. Last year, the United States signed a new, 20-year lease on its military base in Djibouti, Camp Lemonnier, which is a key hub in the US's counterterrorism wars in the Horn of Africa. The US flies surveillance and armed drones out of Camp Lemonnier to spy on and kill militant groups in Somalia and Yemen. Recently, Foreign Policy magazine reported that the US has two military bases in Somalia, from which JSOC operates. The bases are used to carry out counterterrorism operations and surveillance, as well as lethal drone missions.

In order to know where to launch a drone strike or other lethal operation, the US needs intelligence. For drone strikes, the main source for that intelligence is electronic - it's known as "signals intelligence," as it is the result of monitoring anything with an electronic signal. Targeting for US drone strikes and other extrajudicial operations is based on a complex analysis of metadata and tracking of cellphone SIM cards.

Metadata is data about data - such as who called whom at what time, what day, and for how long - rather than the data's actual content. Analyzing electronic intelligence can help analysts connect the dots and map a person's activity, though often not the purpose or substance of that activity. In an earlier email interview, former CIA case officer Robert Steele explained, "Signals intelligence has always relied primarily on seeing the dots and connecting the dots, not on knowing what the dots are saying. When combined with a history of the dots, and particularly the dots coming together in meetings, or a black (anonymous) cellphone residing next to a white (known) cellphone, such that the black acquires the white identity by extension, it becomes possible to 'map' human activity in relation to weapons caches, mosques, meetings, etcetera."

According to The Intercept, "Rather than confirming a target's identity with operatives or informants on the ground, the CIA or the U.S. military then orders a strike based on the activity and location of the mobile phone a person is believed to be using." The NSA will typically pinpoint the location of a suspected terrorist's cellphone or handset SIM card and feed that information to the CIA or JSOC, which will either launch a lethal drone strike or conduct a raid. JSOC used a similar approach when it conducted raids in Iraq and Afghanistan. To capture or kill militants in Iraq and Afghanistan, JSOC analyzed insurgent networks through surveillance drone imagery and the tracking of cellphone numbers.

However, that approach often leads to killing the wrong people. Because the US government is targeting cellphone SIM cards that are supposedly linked to individuals, rather than the individuals themselves, innocent people are regularly killed. Sometimes Taliban leaders in Pakistan - aware of the US government's tracking methods - will randomly distribute SIM cards among their fighters to confuse trackers. People who are unaware their phones are being tracked will often "lend their phone, with the SIM card in it, to friends, children, spouses and family members," according to The Intercept.

Lethal Impacts

The use of signature strikes poses serious legal, strategic and moral questions. The recent Houthi rebellion in Yemen overthrew the US-backed Yemeni government, which the United States relied on to help wage its covert counterterrorism war in the country. As a result, the US has fewer operatives and on-the-ground intelligence sources in Yemen. According to Reuters, the US "will now be forced to rely more on surveillance drones, spy satellites and electronic eavesdropping, as well as their own 'human intelligence' sources on the ground." Thus, the government will defend drone strikes and signature strikes on the basis of convenience and efficacy. The Washington Post reported that "CIA officials have staunchly defended the targeting approach [of signature strikes], saying that analysts poring over drone footage and other surveillance have become adept at detecting patterns - such as the composition and movement of a security detail - associated with senior al-Qaeda operatives." The government also claims that signature strikes have killed many high-value al-Qaeda targets in Pakistan.

So far this year, there have been between 14 to 15 confirmed US drone strikes in Yemen, which have killed 46 to 69 people, according to the Bureau of Investigative Journalism's (TBIJ) figures. In 2014, there were 13 to 15 confirmed US drone strikes in the country, killing between 82 to 118 people, along with 3 additional US attacks that killed 21 to 22 people. TBIJ's figures don't differentiate between who was and was not a "militant," however; that is hard to determine since many drone strike victims are unknown people. The US government largely does not know who it is killing in drone strikes.

Overall, US drone strikes and other counterterrorism operations have, so far, killed between 3,155 and 5,285 people, including around 563 to 1,213 civilians, in Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia, according to TBIJ's numbers. A report by the human rights organization Reprieve found that US drone strikes kill 28 unknown people for each intended target. Only 2 percent of those killed by drone strikes in Pakistan are top-level al-Qaeda leaders. The rest of those killed are either lower-level fighters who pose little existential threat to the US, or else they are simply civilians or other unknown individuals.

Stanford and NYU Law Schools released a joint report in late 2012 revealing that not only do drone strikes cause physical harm, they also "[terrorize] men, women and children, giving rise to anxiety and psychological trauma among civilian communities." Because of the harm, terror and anxiety they inflict, drone strikes breed anti-American resentment and are a useful recruitment tool for militant groups to bring people into their fold.

Jack Serle, a data journalist for TBIJ's Covert Drone War team, who also works on the organization's Naming the Dead project (which names people killed by CIA drone strikes in Pakistan), told Truthout that signature strikes are very imprecise. He said, "Signature strikes, as a concept, is an incredibly imprecise method of carrying out, what we are told are surgically-precise attacks that destroy the cancer of al-Qaeda, whilst leaving the rest of the tissue in fine fettle. Actually, what they're doing is using patterns of behavior that aren't necessarily far from the norm to target groups of people where what the US would consider combatants and would consider noncombatants look pretty much the same and act pretty much the same."

For example, it is fairly common for men in areas of Pakistan to carry rifles for protection, given the region's instability and insecurity. That does not mean that they are necessarily "combatants" or members of the Taliban or al-Qaeda. "The core issue here is, actually, the CIA doesn't really know who they're killing, and they're using a tactic which exacerbates that problem," he added.

Serle pointed out that even though drones have killed some top-level Taliban and al-Qaeda militants, they have not helped stabilize a country like Yemen, which is currently experiencing a civil war. This situation "could well provide AQAP with the space to establish themselves once again like they did in 2011 and 2012." Bombing people in eastern Yemen "isn't the best way to resolve the current crisis," Serle said.

However, alternate ways of addressing terrorism have receded into the background, despite the fact that diplomacy is often the most effective tool for long-term resolution. A RAND study that analyzed 268 terrorist groups worldwide between 1968 and 2006 found that 43 percent ended through a "peaceful political resolution with their government," 40 percent "were penetrated and eliminated by local police and intelligence agencies," while only 7 percent were eliminated by military force.

Beyond their ineffectiveness, Naureen Shah, director of security and human rights at Amnesty International USA, told Truthout that signature strikes are potentially illegal under international law. She explained, "The same rules … apply to signature strikes as [would apply to] any other strike. If it's happening inside an armed conflict then there are rules about distinction and proportionality. The US has to be distinguishing between combatants - people who can be lawfully directly targeted - and people who are civilians who aren't participating in hostilities. The concern about signature strikes is if you do not know if the people that you're targeting are lawful military targets because you don't know their identity then the strike could be unlawful."

Under international law, combatants and lawful military targets can include members of a state's armed forces and militia groups. Shah said that the US's approach of counting military-age males in a strike zone as combatants is "contrary to international humanitarian law - that is the laws of war - [and] it's also contrary to US military manuals that require positive identification of targets prior to any strike."

Shah added there are situations in armed conflicts "where you don't know the precise identity of the people but you could still know that they were a lawful military target or that they were combatants or that they were civilians participating in hostilities." But this assumes that there is a legally declared war taking place. And, of course, the US would still have to abide by international regulations regarding distinction and proportionality in combat.

The entire premise of the US global war on terror is legally unsound. The United States claims it is engaged in an armed conflict with al-Qaeda, the Taliban and "associated forces" - a term the US created to mean co-belligerents with al-Qaeda, such as AQAP. As a result, the US asserts it has the right and duty to engage in extrajudicial killing operations against those groups, even in countries where the US has not declared war, like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia.

However, terrorist and militant groups like al-Qaeda are too loosely organized and disparate to constitute legitimate parties in an armed conflict under international law. For example, AQAP is not the same organization as al-Shabaab or the Taliban. Terrorist groups are more like criminal gangs or drug cartels than armies, paramilitaries or guerrilla fighters. Thus, a so-called "war" against terrorist groups violates the basic tenets of international law.

Future of US Warfare

The advanced computing and intelligence-gathering required for drone strikes signifies what the future of US war-making will look like. To institutionalize the extrajudicial killing program for an indefinite future, the Obama administration created a massive database of terrorism suspects for kill-or-capture operations called the "disposition matrix."

According to the Washington Post, which exposed the matrix's existence in 2012, the "continually evolving" database catalogues "biographies, locations, known associates and affiliated organizations," along with "strategies for taking targets down, including extradition requests, capture operations and drone patrols." The Post notes that "the government expects to continue adding names to kill or capture lists for years," meaning that drone strikes and high-tech military and other lethal operations are becoming a solid fixture in the American war machine.

According to a Government Accountability Office (GAO) report on the military's intelligence-sharing system, "A key challenge facing the military services is providing users with the capabilities to analyze the huge amount of intelligence data being collected." Intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) systems collect and analyze intelligence for numerous military and national security operations. ISR systems include satellites, manned aircraft like the U-2, unmanned drones, ground-based sensors, human intelligence teams, and other ground, air, sea, or space-based equipment. Intelligence can be drawn from numerous sources - publicly available information known as "open-source intelligence," people including spies or informants (human intelligence), maps and imagery called "geospatial intelligence," and electronic data and communications known as "signals intelligence."

The proliferation of drones, growth of new technologies and sensors, expansion of advanced ISR systems (particularly to support the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan), and the changing nature of military operations - with an emphasis on counterinsurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan and counterterrorism in countries like Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia - "changed some of the traditional ways intelligence information was used." As a result, "The need to integrate the large amount of available intelligence data, including the ability to synthesize information from different types of intelligence sources (e.g., HUMINT, SIGINT, GEOINT, and open source), has become increasingly important in addressing, for example, improvised explosive device threats and tracking the activities of certain components of the local population."

A report by the think tank Center for a New American Security (CNAS) argued that "the next several decades may see a period of discontinuous change in both technology and warfare," also known as a "military-technical revolution" or ''revolution in military affairs,'' which is a revolution in ''new military technologies, operational concepts and organizations.'' A simple example would be the shift from bows and arrows to gunpowder. The proliferation of drones and other unmanned systems in the United States and around the world contributes greatly to this change.

According to the GAO report, "From 2002 to 2010, the number of [unstaffed] aerial systems in DOD's [Department of Defense] inventory has increased about forty fold, from about 170 to 7,500 aircraft." The CIA has over 80 Predator drones, while the Air Force has 468 Predators and the Army has 110, according to an October 2014 War Is Boring piece - based on General Atomics' (company that makes Predator drones) numbers - on drone fleet figures.

Finding and killing insurgents and terrorists is difficult, because they know how to mix with (or are part of) the local population, as P.W. Singer explains in his book Wired for War. Drones and other robotic weapons are attractive because they can hover over territory for a long time, surveil and gather intelligence, and fire missiles on command without risking the lives of US troops. However, there are always still people in "harm's way": those at the receiving end of the missile.

Drones are not the only harbinger of a military-technical revolution. The CNAS report says that "[o]ther emerging technologies may disrupt the global military balance as well, such as offensive cyber warfare tools; advanced computing; artificial intelligence; densely interconnected, multi-phenomology sensors; electric weapons such as directed energy, electromagnetic rail guns and high-powered microwave weapons; additive manufacturing and 3-D printing; synthetic biology; and even technologies to enhance human performance on the battlefield."

During the Cold War, the US government funded research and development into advanced technologies that led to "missiles, guided munitions, computer networking, satellites, global positioning" and stealth technology. However, this military-technical revolution, the report says, "is not being led by the American military-industrial complex." Instead, "companies focused on producing consumer goods and business-to-business services are driving many other key enabling technologies, such as advanced computing and 'big data,' autonomy, artificial intelligence, miniaturization, additive manufacturing and small but high density power systems." This means the private sector, particularly Silicon Valley, is driving this military-technical revolution. The report asserts, "All of these technologies - largely evolving in the thriving commercial computing and robotics sectors - could be exploited to build increasingly sophisticated and capable unmanned and autonomous military systems."

In fact, the US war machine is already building strong ties with Silicon Valley. Google, for example, sells its technologies to numerous US military, intelligence and law enforcement agencies, such as the FBI, CIA, NSA, DEA and NGA. The company has a contract with the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) - which provides geospatial intelligence like maps and satellite imagery to the military and other intelligence agencies - that allows the agency to use Google Earth Builder for geospatial intelligence purposes. According to a press release, the contract "allows NGA to customize Google Earth & Maps to provide maps and globes to support U.S. government activities, including: U.S. national security; homeland security; environmental impact and monitoring; and humanitarian assistance, disaster response and preparedness efforts" (emphasis added).

Google also has partnerships with two of the country's biggest defense contractors - Lockheed Martin and Northrop Grumman. Google worked with Lockheed in 2007 to design geospatial technologies, particularly a Google Earth product for the NGA's activities in Iraq during the 2003-2011 war. Google also partners with military/intelligence contractors like Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) and Blackbird Technologies. Blackbird supplies locators that track, tag and locate suspected enemies to the US military, particularly the US Navy and SOCOM. Some Blackbird employees were also sent as armed operatives to join US special operations forces on secret missions. Blackbird's vice president is Cofer Black, a former CIA operative who ran the agency's Counterterrorist Center before 9/11 and helped create the torture program when the war on terror began.

Palantir is another tech company with deep ties to the national security state. The Palo-Alto-based company makes and sells data-mining and analysis software to multiple branches of the US military, as well as intelligence and law enforcement agencies: Its customers include the US Marine Corps, SOCOM, CIA, NSA, FBI, Defense Intelligence Agency, Department of Homeland Security, National Counterterrorism Center, Los Angeles Police Department (LAPD), and New York Police Department (NYPD). According to the Wall Street Journal, Palantir's software is unique because it can quickly scan and categorize - via a " 'tagging' technique similar to that used by the search functions on most Web sites" - multiple sources of incoming data, like a first or last name or phone number. This helps analysts "connect the dots" among large pools of information.

As a result, the US military and many police and intelligence agencies want Palantir's software in their arsenal. US Marines and special operations forces used Palantir's software and found it useful to locate insurgents who made homemade bombs, and for their other missions.

Even if Palantir's technology is useful in certain situations, the real question to ask is to what end is that technology being used. When the US war machine's primary goals are full-spectrum dominance and global hegemony, advanced technology will be used to advance them. Protecting lives takes a backseat to the US's overarching goal of maintaining its global hegemony, especially with respect to technological advances. If any other nation gains a military technological advantage over the United States, then that undermines the US hegemony in the international system. This is more about power projection and protecting US economic and geopolitical interests than "defense." On top of that, making fancy technological tools for the US military and other intelligence agencies is a massive cash-cow for the private sector - from defense/intelligence contractors like Booz Allen Hamilton to Silicon Valley companies like Google.

Futuristic, high-tech militarism is not as "clean" nor "precise" as it is marketed. Drone strikes, particularly signature strikes, are very imprecise, kill thousands of people, and inflict serious harm, suffering and injury. What this new form of militarism does do, however, is maintain the US's permanent war machine in a new form. The US's goals of global hegemony and full-spectrum dominance remain the same. This latest military-technical revolution is simply another - more sophisticated and less visible - way of achieving it.

#### Prioritize our impact—harm to civilians is invisible violence that’s often overlooked by statistics. The impact includes psychological trauma and cultural destruction, which tears apart these communities.

-Drones’ harm to civilians is often underreported and deflated in official reports and measurements

-Can’t just focus on direct civilian body counts from drone strikes—must look at the holistic impact of the drone strike

-It can cause widespread poverty and community frustration, which increases the likelihood of insurgent recruitment

Sarah HOLEWINSKI, former Executive Director of the Center for Civilians in Conflict, Senior Fellow with the Truman National Security Project, 15 [“Just Trust Us: The Need to Know More About the Civilian Impact of US Drone Strikes” in *Drone Wars: Transforming Conflict, Law, and Policy*, ed. by Peter Bergen and Daniel Rothenberg, 2015, p. 49-54]

There is evidence that US drone operations have profound negative consequences for civilian populations. While headlines focus on putting a hard number to militant versus civilian deaths, drone strikes also cause other types [END PAGE 49] of harm. These may be understood as second- or third-order impacts, and they are often overlooked or underestimated as part of support for the drone program's apparent efficacy in killing targeted individuals.

It is important to note that nobody has accurately measured the true extent of civilian harm caused by drones or the related harm done to America's reputation. In fact, the potential costs of the program are almost impossible to measure, whether in dollars, deaths, or reputation. Nevertheless, seriously considering these costs is an important element of ensuring that the United States is balancing the strategic effectiveness of the drone program with its broader impact in order to assess whether it may, in the end, be counterproductive to key strategic goals and legal commitments.

To be sure, there may be cases in which civilians have been spared in a drone strike that might otherwise have died in a bombing raid or ground troop action. Yet this is difficult to ascertain as there is no clear way to calculate the potential of "civilians not harmed." More to the point, the oft-repeated precision of drones has almost certainly been overstated. For example, Brennan likened drone strikes to surgery, saying they could remove the "cancer" of al-Qaeda without affecting the surrounding "tissue" of civilians in the area.27 Brennan's analogy, however, ignores the harms to civilians that we already know about, to say nothing of the impact of unreported strikes. In reality, civilians in drone zones are living through the brutality of a secret war, and the "surgery" Brennan references may be a far blunter instrument than the government acknowledges.

Civilian deaths and injuries- Drones may kill civilians when an individual or group is near an intended target or where they are mistaken for militants. There are also reports of civilians killed when a drone strikes again after an initial strike, including when rescuers come to the aid of those harmed in the first attack.28 This is believed to have occurred in both Pakistan and Yemen.29

The truth of civilian deaths and injuries remains unknown because, to date, there have been no large-scale on-the-ground studies of civilian casualties caused by covert drone strikes in Pakistan, Yemen, or Somalia. Most drone strikes occur in areas inaccessible to foreigners, although several organizations have investigated incidents of civilian harm in Pakistan and have aggregated reports of strikes that appear in the media.30 While findings from these groups vary on the total numbers of civilian deaths, they consistently point to significantly higher civilian casualties than those suggested by the US government.

Statistics shift depending on the definitions used by journalists, analysts, and governments to differentiate between "civilians" and "combatants." While technically these terms are at the core of the law of armed conflict, the ways [END PAGE 50] they are used vary, allowing for distinct and even confusing claims regarding who has been harmed. Media reports routinely cite unnamed Pakistani government officials as confirming the identity of the individuals killed as "militants," but these claims are rarely corroborated. A former senior official in the Obama administration, John Boyle, in a 2013 study for Chatham House, said the administration has been "so successful in spinning the number of civilian casualties is that it has adopted a controversial method for tracking casualties which inflates the totals of 'militants' killed and systematically underestimates civilian casualties."31 A sampling of estimates is seen in Figure 5.

Aside from a debate about the numbers of those killed, a single civilian death or injury is enough to dramatically alter families' lives. In Pakistan, families are often large and their well-being depends on intricate connections among many members. The death of one person in a family can create long-lasting instability, particularly if the individual killed is the primary breadwinner.

In regions most often targeted by drones, women typically have a limited earning capacity, few families have significant savings, and insurance is nonexistent. This leaves the wives and dependents of those severely injured and extremely vulnerable. A single drone attack may force a family into poverty. It may lead sons to drop out of school to provide for their family and prevent daughters from pursuing educational opportunities because they may have to take on the role of caretakers.32 Similar familial dynamics exist in Somalia and Yemen.

While the missiles used by the United States can hit precise targets and are thus more likely to kill than to injure, injuries in drone attacks occur. Hakeem [END PAGE 51] Khan, from Mohmand Agency in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, lost his leg to flying debris after a drone struck his neighbor's house. He told the Center for Civilians in Conflict: "I am living a very painful life … I use a stick to support my body and find it too difficult to move from place to place. I need compensation for the loss of my leg."33

Given that serious injuries can devastate a family for generations, civilian casualty statistics indicate an affected population many times greater than the numbers of those directly killed or wounded, highlighting the broad social impact of drone attacks.

Psychological impact- Civilian deaths, injuries, displacement, and property loss caused by conflict are traumatic for the local population. Covert drone strikes take a particular toll, striking unannounced and without any clear public understanding of who is - and importantly, who is not - a target. For victims, there is no one to turn to for formal recognition, apologies, or explanations to mitigate their sorrow. And for communities living under the constant watch of drones, there is no one to hold accountable for their fear or suffering. Drone strikes not only produce civilian death and injury, but also create long-term, unseen impact that tear at the fabric of communities.

In places such as the tribal areas of northwestern Pakistan, where drones often buzz overhead for 24 hours a day, people live in constant fear of being attacked.34 Michael Kugelman of the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars notes: "I have heard Pakistanis speak about children in the tribal areas who become hysterical when they hear the characteristic buzz of a drone ... Imagine the effect this has on psyches, and particularly on young ones already scarred by war and displacement."35

Unlike deaths and property loss, which may affect one or more families, the fear associated with covert drone strikes affects nearly everyone in the communities under drone surveillance. One victim told the Center for Civilians in Conflict: "We fear that the drones will strike us again ... my aged parents are often in a state of fear. We are depressed, anxious, and constantly remembering our deceased family members ... it often compels me to leave this place."36 Another man described the anguish of his sister-in-law, who lost her husband and two sons in a US drone strike in Pakistan: "After their death she is mentally upset ... she is always screaming and shouting at night and demanding me to take her to their graves."37

An investigator at the UK advocacy group Reprieve met a young man named Tariq Aziz shortly before he was killed in strike on March 17, 2011, reporting: [END PAGE 52]

I asked him, "Have you seen a drone," and I expected him to say, "Yes, I see one a week." But he said they saw 10 or 15 every day. And he was saying at nighttime, it was making him crazy, because he couldn't sleep. All he was thinking about at home was whether everyone was okay. I could see it in his face. He looked absolutely terrified.38

With US targeting criteria classified, civilians in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia do not know when, where, or against whom drones will strike. The US policy of signature strikes compounds these fears because family members might be unexpectedly and suddenly killed without realizing that they were acting in a way that defined them as a target. Finally, civilian victims of drone strikes have been assumed by their communities to be connected to militant actions. In this way, victims may face the double burden of dealing with the aftermath of an attack as well as with the stigma associated with having been targeted.

Property loss, displacement, development, and poverty - A house is often a family's greatest financial asset and its destruction can be financially and socially devastating. In Pakistan's tribal areas, homes are often shared by multiple families, compounding the suffering and hardship caused when a house is damaged or destroyed.

Remote drone operations have struck many homes, including those of individuals and families that pose no threat to the United States. For example, Usman Wazir of northwest Pakistan is now homeless and sleeps either at the local mosque or with relatives since a drone destroyed his home and killed his brother, his sister-in-law, and their two teenage children. Shakeel Khan, also of northwest Pakistan, and his elderly parents survived a drone attack on their home, which killed his brother, his sister-in-law, and their children. He explained: "We don't have enough to reconstruct our house and fear that the drones will strike us again."39 Daud Khan and the surviving members of his family were forced to move from their village in Waziristan when they could not afford to rebuild their home destroyed in a drone strike.40

Drone strikes have also hit homes in Yemen, adding to the displacement of the population caused by local and national conflicts.41 An airstrike in Jaar in southern Yemen reduced an entire block to rubble in two consecutive explosions. Because of the secret nature of these missions, it remains unclear whether the attack was the responsibility of the US or Yemeni government, compounding a sense of frustration and the impossibility of accountability or recognition for victims.42

Some Somali civilians have fled their homes out of fear of drone attacks targeting al-Shabaab. In January 2012, citizens of the small town of Elasha Biyaha on the outskirts of Mogadishu fled to the main city to seek refuge after [END PAGE 53] strikes killed a senior rebel leader there.43 Lisa Schirch of 3P Human Security explains the impact of these attacks: "[D]rone-related displacement disrupts long-term stability by decreasing the capacity of local people to respond through civil society initiatives that foster stability, democracy and moderation and increase displaced people's vulnerability to insurgent recruitment."44

The threat of drone strikes in Yemen and Pakistan and the resulting fear of random or at least unpredictable targeting have led parents to prevent their children from attending schools.45 And, in Pakistan there have been several reports of drone strikes that have damaged or destroyed local schools.46

#### Plan: The United States should significantly reduce its counterterrorism military presence in the Greater Horn of Africa.

#### Security-driven counterterrorism creates the enabling conditions for permanent militarism.

Vivienne JABRI, Director of the Centre for IR and Senior Lecturer at the Department of War Studies, King’s College London, 6 [March 2006, “War, Security and the Liberal State,” *Security Dialogue*, 37 (1), p. 47-64, Accessed through Emory Libraries]

LATE MODERN TRANSFORMATIONS are often conceived in terms of the sociopolitical and economic manifestations of change emergent from a globalized arena. What is less apparent is how late modernity as a distinct era has impacted upon our conceptions of the social sphere, our lived experience, and our reflections upon the discourses and institutions that form the taken-for-granted backdrop of the known and the knowable. The paradigmatic certainties of modernity – the state, citizenship, democratic space, humanity’s infinite capacity for progress, the defeat of dogma and the culmination of modernity’s apotheosis in the free-wheeling market place – have in the late modern era come face to face with uncertainty, unpredictability and the gradual erosion of the modern belief that we could indeed simply move on, assisted by science and technology, towards a condition where instrumental rationality would become the linchpin of government and human interaction irrespective of difference. Progress came to be associated with peace, and both were constitutively linked to the universal, the global, the human, and therefore the cosmopolitan. What shatters such illusions is the recollection of the 20th century as the ‘age of extremes’ (Hobsbawm, 1995), and the 21st as the age of the ever-present condition of war. While we might prefer a forgetting of things past, a therapeutic anamnesis that manages to reconfigure history, it is perhaps the continuities with the past that act as antidote to such righteous comforts.

How, then, do we begin to conceptualize war in conditions where distinctions disappear, where war is conceived, or indeed articulated in political discourse, in terms of peace and security, so that the political is somehow banished in the name of governmentalizing practices whose purview knows no bounds, whose remit is precisely the banishment of limits, of boundaries and distinctions. Boundaries, however, do not disappear. Rather, they become manifest in every instance of violence, every instance of control, every instance of practices targeted against a constructed other, the enemy within and without, the all-pervasive presence, the defences against which come to form the legitimizing tool of war.

Any scholarly take on the present juncture of history, any analysis of the dynamics of the present, must somehow render the narrative in measured tones, taking all factors into account, lest the narrator is accused of exaggeration at best and particular political affiliations at worst. When the late modern condition of the West, of the European arena, is one of camps, one of the detention of groups of people irrespective of their individual needs as migrants, one of the incarceration without due process of suspects, one of overwhelming police powers to stop, search and detain, one of indefinite detention in locations beyond law, one of invasion and occupation, then language itself is challenged in its efforts to contain the description of what is. The critical scholarly take on the present is then precisely to reveal the conditions of possibility in relation to how we got here, to unravel the enabling dynamics that led to the disappearance of distinctions between war and criminality, war and peace, war and security. When such distinctions disappear, impunity is the result, accountability shifts beyond sight, and violence comes to form the linchpin of control. We can reveal the operations of violence, but far more critical is the revelation of power and how power operates in the present. As the article argues, such an exploration raises fundamental questions relating to the relationship of power and violence, and their mutual interconnection in the complex interstices of disrupted time and space locations. Power and violence are hence separable analytical categories, separable practices; they are at the same time connected in ways that work on populations and on bodies – with violence often targeted against the latter so that the former are reigned in, governed. Where Michel Foucault sought, in his later writings, to distinguish between power and violence, to reveal the subtle workings of power, now, in the present, this article will venture, perhaps the distinction is no longer viable when we witness the indistinctions I highlight above.

The article provides an analysis of the place of war in late modern politics. In particular, it concentrates on the implications of war for our conceptions of the liberty–security problematique in the context of the modern liberal state. The first section of the article argues the case for the figure of war as analyser of the present. The second section of the article reveals the conditions of possibility for a distinctly late modern mode of war and its imbrications in politics. The final section of the article concentrates on the political implications of the primacy of war in late modernity, and in particular on possibilities of dissent and articulations of political agency. The aim throughout is to provide the theoretical and conceptual tools that might begin to meet the challenges of the present and to open an agenda of research that concentrates on the politics of the present, the capacities or otherwise of contestation and accountability, and the institutional locations wherein such political agency might emerge.

The Figure of War and the Spectre of Security

The so-called war against terrorism is constructed as a global war, transcending space and seemingly defiant of international conventions. It is distinguished from previous global wars, including the first and the second world wars, in that the latter two have, in historiography, always been analysed as interstate confrontations, albeit ones that at certain times and in particular locations peripherally involved non-state militias. Such distinctions from the old, of course, will be subject to future historical narratives on the present confrontation and its various parameters. What is of interest in the present discussion is the distinctly global aspect of this war, for it is the globality1 of the war against terrorism that renders it particularly relevant and pertinent to investigations that are primarily interested in the relationship between war and politics, war and the political processes defining the modern state. The initial premise of the present article is that war, rather than being confined to its own time and space, permeates the normality of the political process, has, in other words, a defining influence on elements considered to be constitutive of liberal democratic politics, including executive answerability, legislative scrutiny, a public sphere of discourse and interaction, equal citizenship under the law and, to follow liberal thinkers such as Habermas, political legitimacy based on free and equal communicative practices underpinning social solidarity (Habermas, 1997). War disrupts these elements and is a time of crisis and emergency. A war that has a permanence to it clearly normalizes the exceptional, inscribing emergency into the daily routines of social and political life. While the elements of war – conflict, social fragmentation, exclusion – may run silently through the assemblages of control in liberal society (Deleuze, 1986), nevertheless the persistent iteration of war into politics brings these practices to the fore, and with them a call for a rethinking of war’s relationship to politics.

The distinctly global spatiality of this war suggests particular challenges that have direct impact on the liberal state, its obligations towards its citizenry, and the extent to which it is implicated in undermining its own political institutions. It would, however, be a mistake to assume that the practices involved in this global war are in any way anathema to the liberal state. The analysis provided here would argue that while it is crucial to acknowledge the transformative impact of the war against terrorism, it is equally as important to appreciate the continuities in social and political life that are the enabling conditions of this global war, forming its conditions of possibility. These enabling conditions are not just present or apparent at global level, but incorporate local practices that are deep-rooted and institutionalized. The mutually reinforcing relationship between global and local conditions renders this particular war distinctly all-pervasive, and potentially, in terms of implications, far more threatening to the spaces available for political contestation and dissent.

Contemporary global politics is dominated by what might be called a ‘matrix of war’2 constituted by a series of transnational practices that variously target states, communities and individuals. These practices involve states as agents, bureaucracies of states and supranational organizations, quasi-official and private organizations recruited in the service of a global machine that is highly militarized and hence led by the United States, but that nevertheless incorporates within its workings various alliances that are always in flux. The crucial element in understanding the matrix of war is the notion of ‘practice’, for this captures the idea that any practice is not just situated in a system of enablements and constraints, but is itself constitutive of structural continuities, both discursive and institutional. As Paul Veyne (1997: 157) writes in relation to Foucault’s use of the term, ‘practice is not an agency (like the Freudian id) or a prime mover (like the relation of production), and moreover for Foucault, there is no agency nor any prime mover’. It is in this recursive sense that practices (of violence, exclusion, intimidation, control and so on) become structurated in the routines of institutions as well as lived experience (Jabri, 1996). To label the contemporary global war as a ‘war against terrorism’ confers upon these practices a certain legitimacy, suggesting that they are geared towards the elimination of a direct threat. While the threat of violence perpetrated by clandestine networks against civilians is all too real and requires state responses, many of these responses appear to assume a wide remit of operations – so wide that anyone interested in the liberties associated with the democratic state, or indeed the rights of individuals and communities, is called upon to unravel the implications of such practices.

When security becomes the overwhelming imperative of the democratic state, its legitimization is achieved both through a discourse of ‘balance’ between security and liberty and in terms of the ‘protection’ of liberty.3 The implications of the juxtaposition of security and liberty may be investigated either in terms of a discourse of ‘securitization’ (the power of speech acts to construct a threat juxtaposed with the power of professionals precisely to so construct)4 or, as argued in this article, in terms of a discourse of war. The grammars involved are closely related, and yet that of the latter is, paradoxically, the critical grammar, the grammar that highlights the workings of power and their imbrications with violence. What is missing from the securitization literature is an analytic of war, and it is this analytic that I want to foreground in this article.

The practices that I highlight above seem at first hand to constitute different response mechanisms in the face of what is deemed to be an emergency situation in the aftermath of the events of 11 September 2001. The invasion and occupation of Iraq, the incarceration without due process of prisoners in camps from Afghanistan to Guantánamo and other places as yet unidentified, the use of torture against detainees, extra-judicial assassination, the detention and deportation – again without due process – of foreign nationals deemed a threat, increasing restrictions on refugees, their confinement in camps and detention centres, the construction of the movement of peoples in security terms, and restrictions on civil liberties through domestic legislation in the UK, the USA and other European states are all represented in political discourse as necessary security measures geared towards the protection of society. All are at the same time institutional measures targeted against a particular other as enemy and source of danger.

It could be argued that the above practices remain unrelated and must hence be subject to different modes of analysis. To begin with, these practices involve different agents and are framed around different issues. Afghanistan and Iraq may be described as situations of war, and the incarceration of refugees as encompassing practices of security. However, what links these elements is not so much that they constitute a constructed taxonomy of differentiated practices. Rather, what links them is the element of antagonism directed against distinct and particular others. Such a perspective suggests that the politics of security, including the production of fear and a whole array of exclusionary measures, comes to service practices that constitute war and locates the discourse of war at the heart of politics, not just domestically, but, more crucially in the present context, globally. The implications for the late modern state and the distinctly liberal state are monumental, for a perpetual war on a global scale has implications for political structures and political agency, for our conceptions of citizenship and the role of the state in meeting the claims of its citizens,5 and for the workings of a public sphere that is increasingly global and hence increasingly multicultural.

The matrix of war is centrally constituted around the element of antagonism, having an association with existential threat: the idea that the continued presence of the other constitutes a danger not just to the well-being of society but to its continued existence in the form familiar to its members, hence the relative ease with which European politicians speak of migrants of particular origins as forming a threat to the ‘idea of Europe’ and its Christian origins.6 Herein lies a discourse of cultural and racial exclusion based on a certain fear of the other. While the war against specific clandestine organizations7 involves operations on both sides that may be conceptualized as a classical war of attrition, what I am referring to as the matrix of war is far more complex, for here we have a set of diffuse practices, violence, disciplinarity and control that at one and same time target the other typified in cultural and racial terms and instantiate a wider remit of operations that impact upon society as a whole.

The practices of warfare taking place in the immediate aftermath of 11 September 2001 combine with societal processes, reflected in media representations and in the wider public sphere, where increasingly the source of threat, indeed the source of terror, is perceived as the cultural other, and specifically the other associated variously with Islam, the Middle East and South Asia. There is, then, a particularity to what Agamben (1995, 2004) calls the ‘state of exception’, a state not so much generalized and generalizable, but one that is experienced differently by different sectors of the global population. It is precisely this differential experience of the exception that draws attention to practices as diverse as the formulation of interrogation techniques by military intelligence in the Pentagon, to the recent provisions of counter-terrorism measures in the UK,8 to the legitimizing discourses surrounding the invasion of Iraq. All are practices that draw upon a dis- course of legitimization based on prevention and pre-emption. Enemies constructed in the discourses of war are hence always potential, always abstract even when identified, and, in being so, always drawn widely and, in consequence, communally. There is, hence, a ‘profile’ to the state of exception and its experience. Practices that profile particular communities, including the citizens of European states, create particular challenges to the self-understanding of the liberal democratic state and its capacity, in the 21st century, to deal with difference.

While a number of measures undertaken in the name of security, such as proposals for the introduction of identity cards in the UK or increasing surveillance of financial transactions in the USA, might encompass the population as a whole, the politics of exception is marked by racial and cultural signification. Those targeted by exceptional measures are members of particular racial and cultural communities. The assumed threat that underpins the measures highlighted above is one that is now openly associated variously with Islam as an ideology, Islam as a mode of religious identification, Islam as a distinct mode of lifestyle and practice, and Islam as a particular brand associated with particular organizations that espouse some form of a return to an Islamic Caliphate. When practices are informed by a discourse of antagonism, no distinctions are made between these various forms of individual and communal identification. When communal profiling takes place, the distinction between, for example, the choice of a particular lifestyle and the choice of a particular organization disappears, and diversity within the profiled community is sacrificed in the name of some ‘precautionary’ practice that targets all in the name of security.9 The practices and language of antagonism, when racially and culturally inscribed, place the onus of guilt onto the entire community so identified, so that its individual members can no longer simply be citizens of a secular, multicultural state, but are constituted in discourse as particular citizens, subjected to particular and hence exceptional practices. When the Minister of State for the UK Home Office states that members of the Muslim community should expect to be stopped by the police, she is simply expressing the condition of the present, which is that the Muslim community is particularly vulnerable to state scrutiny and invasive measures that do not apply to the rest of the citizenry.10 We know, too, that a distinctly racial profiling is taking place, so that those who are physically profiled are subjected to exceptional measures.

Even as the so-called war against terrorism recognizes no boundaries as limits to its practices – indeed, many of its practices occur at transnational, often indefinable, spaces – what is crucial to understand, however, is that this does not mean that boundaries are no longer constructed or that they do not impinge on the sphere of the political. The paradox of the current context is that while the war against terrorism in all its manifestations assumes a boundless arena, borders and boundaries are at the heart of its operations. The point to stress is that these boundaries and the exclusionist practices that sustain them are not coterminous with those of the state; rather, they could be said to be located and perpetually constructed upon the corporeality of those constructed as enemies, as threats to security. It is indeed the corporeal removal of such subjects that lies at the heart of what are constructed as counter-terrorist measures, typified in practices of direct war, in the use of torture, in extra-judicial incarceration and in judicially sanctioned detention. We might, then, ask if such measures constitute violence or relations of power, where, following Foucault, we assume that the former acts upon bodies with a view to injury, while the latter acts upon the actions of subjects and assumes, as Deleuze (1986: 70–93) suggests, a relation of forces and hence a subject who can act. What I want to argue here is that violence is imbricated in relations of power, is a mode of control, a technology of governmentality. When the population of Iraq is targeted through aerial bombardment, the consequence goes beyond injury and seeks the pacification of the Middle East as a political region.

When legislative and bureaucratic measures are put in place in the name of security, those targeted are categories of population. At the same time, the war against terrorism and the security discourses utilized in its legitimization are conducted and constructed in terms that imply the defence or protection of populations. One option is to limit policing, military and intelligence efforts through the targeting of particular organizations. However, it is the limitless construction of the war against terrorism, its targeting of particular racial and cultural communities, that is the source of the challenge presented to the liberal democratic state. In conditions constructed in terms of emergency, war permeates discourses on politics, so that these come to be subject to the restraints and imperatives of war and practices constituted in terms of the demands of security against an existential threat. The implications for liberal democratic politics and our conceptions of the modern state and its institutions are far-reaching,11 for the liberal democratic polity that considers itself in a state of perpetual war is also a state that is in a permanent state of mobilization, where every aspect of public life is geared towards combat against potential enemies, internal and external.

One of the most significant lessons we learn from Michel Foucault’s writings is that war, or ‘the distant roar of battle’ (Foucault, 1977: 308), is never quite so distant from liberal governmentality. Conceived in Foucaultian terms, war and counter-terrorist measures come to be seen not as discontinuity from liberal government, but as emergent from the enabling conditions that liberal government and the modern state has historically set in place. On reading Foucault’s renditions on the emergence of the disciplinary society, what we see is the continuation of war in society and not, as in Hobbes and elsewhere in the history of thought, the idea that wars happen at the outskirts of society and its civil order. The disciplinary society is not simply an accumulation of institutional and bureaucratic procedures that permeate the everyday and the routine; rather, it has running through its interstices the constitutive elements of war as continuity, including confrontation, struggle and the corporeal removal of those deemed enemies of society. In Society Must Be Defended (Foucault, 2003) and the first volume of the History of Sexuality (Foucault, 1998), we see reference to the discursive and institutional continuities that structurate war in society. Reference to the ‘distant roar of battle’ suggests confrontation and struggle; it suggests the ever-present construction of threat accrued to the particular other; it suggests the immediacy of threat and the construction of fear of the enemy; and ultimately it calls for the corporeal removal of the enemy as source of threat. The analytic of war also encompasses the techniques of the military and their presence in the social sphere – in particular, the control and regulation of bodies, timed precision and instrumentality that turn a war machine into an active and live killing machine. In the matrix of war, there is hence the level of discourse and the level of institutional practices; both are mutually implicating and mutually enabling. There is also the level of bodies and the level of population. In Foucault’s (1998: 152) terms: ‘the biological and the historical are not consecutive to one another . . . but are bound together in an increasingly complex fashion in accordance with the development of the modern technologies of power that take life as their objective’.

What the above suggests is the idea of war as a continuity in social and political life. The matrix of war suggests both discursive and institutional practices, technologies that target bodies and populations, enacted in a complex array of locations. The critical moment of this form of analysis is to point out that war is not simply an isolated occurrence taking place as some form of interruption to an existing peaceful order. Rather, this peaceful order is imbricated with the elements of war, present as continuities in social and political life, elements that are deeply rooted and enabling of the actuality of war in its traditional battlefield sense. This implies a continuity of sorts between the disciplinary, the carceral and the violent manifestations of government.

#### This structural violence locks in social and environmental depletion, which culminates in extinction and makes war inevitable.

Tamás SZENTES is a Professor Emeritus at the Corvinus University of Budapest, and member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, ‘8 [April 22, 2008, “Globalisation and prospects of the world society,” http://www.eadi.org/fileadmin/Documents/Events/exco/Glob.\_\_\_prospects\_-\_jav..pdf, (Gender modified—Sigalos)]

(1) It’ s a common place that human society can survive and develop only in a lasting real peace. Without peace countries cannot develop. Although since 1945 there has been no world war, but

• numerous local wars took place,

• terrorism has spread all over the world, undermining security even in the most developed and powerful countries,

• arms race and militarisation have not ended with the collapse of the Soviet bloc, but escalated and continued, extending also to weapons of mass destruction and misusing enormous resources badly needed for development,

• many “invisible wars”1 are suffered by the poor and oppressed people, manifested in mass misery, poverty, unemployment, homelessness, starvation and malnutrition, epidemics and poor health conditions, exploitation and oppression, racial and other discrimination, physical terror, organised injustice, disguised forms of violence, the denial or regular infringement of the democratic rights of citizens, women, youth, ethnic or religious minorities, etc., and last but not least, in the degradation of human environment, which means that

• the “war against Nature”, i.e. the disturbance of ecological balance, wasteful management of natural resources, and large-scale pollution of our environment, is still going on, causing also losses and fatal dangers for human life.

Behind global terrorism and “invisible wars” we find striking international and intra society inequities and distorted development patterns 2 , which tend to generate social as well as international tensions, thus paving the way for unrest and “visible” wars.

It is a commonplace now that peace is not merely the absence of war. The prerequisites of a lasting peace between and within societies involve not only - though, of course, necessarily - demilitarisation, but also a systematic and gradual elimination of the roots of violence, of the causes of “invisible wars”, of the structural and institutional bases of large-scale international and intra-society inequalities, exploitation and oppression. Peace requires a process of social and national emancipation, a progressive, democratic transformation of societies and the world bringing about equal rights and opportunities for all people, sovereign participation and mutually advantageous co-operation among nations. It further requires a pluralistic democracy on global level with an appropriate system of proportional representation of the world society, articulation of diverse interests and their peaceful reconciliation, by non-violent conflict management, and thus also a global governance with a really global institutional system.

Under the contemporary conditions of accelerating globalisation and deepening global interdependencies in our world, peace is indivisible in both time and space. It cannot exist if reduced to a period only after or before war, and cannot be safeguarded in one part of the world when some others suffer visible or invisible wars. Thus, peace requires, indeed, a new, demilitarised and democratic world order, which can provide equal opportunities for sustainable development.

“Sustainability of development” (both on national and world level) is often interpreted as an issue of environmental protection only and reduced to the need for preserving the ecological balance and delivering the next generations not a destroyed Nature with over exhausted resources and polluted environment. However, no ecological balance can be ensured, unless the deep international development gap and intra-society inequalities are substantially reduced.

Owing to global interdependencies there may exist hardly any “zero-sum-games”, in which one can gain at the expense of others, but, instead, the “negative-sum-games” tend to predominate, in which everybody must suffer, later or sooner, directly or indirectly, losses. Therefore, the actual question is not about “sustainability of development” but rather about the “sustainability of human life”, i.e. survival of [hu]mankind – because of ecological imbalance and globalised terrorism.

When Professor Louk de la Rive Box was the president of EADI, one day we had an exchange of views on the state and future of development studies. We agreed that development studies are not any more restricted to the case of underdeveloped countries, as the developed ones (as well as the former “socialist” countries) are also facing development problems, such as those of structural and institutional (and even system-) transformation, requirements of changes in development patterns, and concerns about natural environment. While all these are true, today I would dare say that besides (or even instead of) “development studies” we must speak about and make “survival studies”.

While the monetary, financial, and debt crises are cyclical, we live in an almost permanent crisis of the world society, which is multidimensional in nature, involving not only economic but also socio-psychological, behavioural, cultural and political aspects. The narrow-minded, election-oriented, selfish behaviour motivated by thirst for power and wealth, which still characterise the political leadership almost all over the world, paves the way for the final, last catastrophe.

One cannot doubt, of course, that great many positive historical changes have also taken place in the world in the last century. Such as decolonisation, transformation of socio-economic systems, democratisation of political life in some former fascist or authoritarian states, institutionalisation of welfare policies in several countries, rise of international organisations and new forums for negotiations, conflict management and cooperation, institutionalisation of international assistance programmes by multilateral agencies, codification of human rights, and rights of sovereignty and democracy also on international level, collapse of the militarised Soviet bloc and system-change3 in the countries concerned, the end of cold war, etc., to mention only a few. Nevertheless, the crisis of the world society has extended and deepened, approaching to a point of bifurcation that necessarily puts an end to the present tendencies, either by the final catastrophe or a common solution.

Under the circumstances provided by rapidly progressing science and technological revolutions, human society cannot survive unless such profound intra-society and international inequalities prevailing today are soon eliminated. Like a single spacecraft, the Earth can no longer afford to have a 'crew' divided into two parts: the rich, privileged, well- fed, well-educated, on the one hand, and the poor, deprived, starving, sick and uneducated, on the other.

Dangerous 'zero-sum-games' (which mostly prove to be “negative-sum-games”) can hardly be played any more by visible or invisible wars in the world society. Because of global interdependencies, the apparent winner becomes also a loser. The real choice for the world society is between negative- and positive-sum-games: i.e. between, on the one hand, continuation of visible and “invisible wars”, as long as this is possible at all, and, on the other, transformation of the world order by demilitarisation and democratization. No ideological or terminological camouflage can conceal this real dilemma any more, which is to be faced not in the distant future, by the next generations, but in the coming years, because of global terrorism soon having nuclear and other mass destructive weapons, and also due to irreversible changes in natural environment.

#### Alternative social sciences are necessary to dismantle the military-industrial-academic complex, as well as neo-imperial missions like AFRICOM.

-We need a new research agenda to combat the current, genocidal one

Horace CAMPBELL, Professor of African American Studies and Political Science at Syracuse University, AND Amber MURREY, PhD student in the School of Geography and the Environment at the University of Oxford, 14 [“Culture-centric pre-emptive counterinsurgency and US Africa Command: assessing the role of the US social sciences in US military engagements in Africa,” *Third World Quarterly*, Vol. 35, Issue 8, 2014, p. 1457-1475, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

The role of social science in full-spectrum domination

Research conducted at the behest of militaries on African peoples and societies has been destructive for African people and communities throughout history.69 During the Cold War the dod commissioned studies to sustain what Edward Herman and Noam Chomsky call ‘manufacturing consent’ or the propaganda model.70 Mark Solovey calls this relationship the ‘politics, patronage and social science nexus’.71 According to this model, public support for social, political and economic policies is systematically constructed through a propaganda media machine. In the failed attempt to ensure US technological dominance during the Cold War, the dod racked up massive expenditures in the social sciences. Richard C Lewontin calls the period of the Cold War a ‘golden age for professors’, as dod funding saw university budgets increase twentyfold in constant dollars between 1946 and 1991.72 These dod monies were also allocated to research in Africa and to leading research centres in the USA.73 Government funding was augmented by private organisations such as the Rockefeller Foundation and by European governments, which also invested in social science research projects in Africa. Although the scope of dod funding for social science research during the period was extraordinary, it is often next to impossible to identify the exact details of studies funded. Not only are records of dod-funded projects unavailable to the public, but the cia deliberately leaked ‘disinformation’ for the purposes of camouflaging its actions.74

Feminists, PanAfricanists and peace scholars have been at the forefront in promoting an interdisciplinary social science work that seeks an alternative to genocidal politics and economics. In his book on the domains of matriarchy and patriarchy Cheikh Anta Diop writes of an anthropology with possible emancipatory implications.75 This anthropology explores the legacies of matriarchy to combat masculinisation, militarism and violence in Africa. A distinction is made between the anthropology of masculinisation, militarism and violence and the anthropology of new family forms and the emancipation of women.76 The relationship between exploitation, masculinity, violence and imperial domination have been taken up by feminist social scientists, whose scholarship has challenged male-centred realist conceptions of militarism, violence and ‘security’.77

It is clear from the statements of top officers and the annual reports of US Africa Command that social science research and ‘intelligence superiority’ is a dominant concern of the mission in Africa. To fill this research gap the US military, the Department of Education and the Department of State call upon US academics to conduct field research on a variety of cultural and socio-political subjects. dod employs an understanding of culture as the unifying range of activities, ideas, beliefs and traditions among a group of people, which is transmitted and reinforced by members of that group. Our analysis draws from Amilcar Cabral’s conceptualisation of culture within the context of liberation. Cabral, an intellectual and freedom fighter, wrote on the importance of maintaining cultural identity for human emancipation and liberation movements: ‘the value of culture as an element of resistance to foreign domination lies in the fact that culture is the vigorous manifestation, on the ideological or idealist level, of the material and historical reality of the society that is dominated or to be dominated’.78 Culture is an essential element of life and of community; as such, it plays a critical role in self-determination.79 Knowledge of another group can facilitate cross-cultural understanding or it can be used to control, manipulate and exploit. The focus within Africom on ‘intelligence superiority’ is an illustration of efforts to know a population in order to anticipate and circumvent the potential development of (a wide range of) potential instabilities to market security.

US military funding of social science research is not particular to Africa: it is also central to military endeavour in the Middle East as well as in Central and South America. The funding takes particular forms in African nations and carries specific political consequences, particularly considering competing capitalists interests, which fuel large-scale accumulation by dispossession. There were 32 different research projects commissioned by Africom for 2011. A review of the research topics, compiled by the Directorate for Outreach of Africa Command and conducted by students at senior US professional military education institutions, reveals that research interests include (1) determining African perceptions and receptions to US Africa Command and the US military; (2) competition for Rare Earth Elements;80 and (3) military-to-military support for African governments.81 Additional subjects include studies on African governance, African militaries and the characteristics of West and Northern African terrorist activities.

Africom funded a study in 2011, for example, that looked at combatant sexual violence in the eastern Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). The study is problematic for its avoidance of a historical context and for its lack of acknowledgement of the culture of sexual violence inherent in militarism, including (even particularly) in the US military.82 From the assertions during a presentation at the headquarters of US Africa Command in Stuttgart given by two of the lead researchers, Dr Lynn Lawry and Dr Michele Wagner, it is apparent that material from the study will inform Africom engagements with sexual violence treatment seminars for African military personnel. However, it is unclear what forms these interventions will take and how they will avoid re-traumatising sexual abuse survivors. Sexual violence as a component of warfare in the DRC has been widely researched and publicised before the commissioning of this project by Africom; it would seem that some research projects are most probably publicity campaigns to bolster Africom’s image as a humanitarian agency.

By considering the doctrine of pre-emptive counterinsurgency, the US military’s interest in culture-centric counterinsurgency, and the establishment of Africom with its focus on knowledge superiority, the US security establishment seeks to create an American-friendly climate through a combination of psy-ops and propaganda. One article, which is drawn from research commissioned by Africom, examines 11 African countries for convergent structural conditions, catalysts and triggers that might prove to be ‘potential fissures and stressors that might lead in the coming decade to significant social dislocation or political instability’.83 The purpose of the report is to predict scenarios that ‘might converge to create the conditions for instability’.84 The report’s authors position their findings within the context of ‘African Awakenings’ or the uprisings and popular political mobilisations across Africa that began in late December 2010 and continued through 2011. They write that, ‘the upheavals in North Africa since the beginning of 2011 underline the dangers of ignoring these core grievances’.85 The emergence of powerful pro-people movements in Africa has considerable consequences for transnational capitalist interests, which have been able to accumulate enormous capital through mechanisms of dispossession. In the framework of Africom African popular uprisings against authoritarian regimes are merged into the discourse of perpetual threat, chaos and instability, becoming yet another factor contributing to the perceived instability of the continent.

These uprisings against authoritarianism – from Burkina Faso to South Africa to Tunisia to Cameroon – indicate the need for social science to assist the peoples of Africa in the processes of social empowerment and the attainment of a better quality of life. In response to the democratic movements in Tunisia and Egypt the US government was alternately hesitant and undecided in supporting the voice of the people, illustrating the fact that US foreign policy is more concerned with maintaining the status quo than with working on behalf of the human and economic rights of people around the world. Indeed, General Ham writes of the shift in strategic role of Africom during this period, ‘the dynamic security environments that followed the Arab Awakening have increased requirements for crisis response capabilities’.86 There continues to be an ideological disconnect between the foundational discourse of American democracy – liberty, justice and the right to self-governance – and US geopolitical strategy and interests, as popular mobilisations and uprisings, including peaceful ones, contribute to the US security establishment’s calls for an ever-increasing crisis response.

Conclusion

In March 2011 NATO started Operation Odyssey Dawn to ‘protect’ civilians in Libya as part of multinational military operations under the auspices of the UN Security Council Resolution 1973.87 This included Tomahawk cruise missile attacks and eventually led to the extrajudicial killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. The US-orchestrated ‘no fly zone’ in Libya was a means to co-opt the movement. ‘In Libya, the military intervention, supposedly to assist revolution, was used to corral and control the revolutionary process, ultimately making it militarily, economically and ideologically a vassal of the Western powers’.88 A cursory review of the USA’s varied engagements with and responses to the ‘African Awakenings’ of 2010 and 2011 illustrate the need for detailed, site-specific knowledge to dictate the US response and then publicise that response to the international community. The State Department’s response to political uprisings in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya and Bahrain, for example, while markedly different, indicate that the primary concern was not the plights of nationals of the country in question. In fact, in the case of the nato-led intervention in Libya, the destruction of society provided the cover for US intelligence agencies to use eastern Libya as a base for the recruitment of Jihadists to fight in Syria. The same government that was supposedly waging a war on terror was mobilising Jihadists in Libya and manipulating the instability there to spread insecurity and warfare from Mali to Aleppo. The study of African culture and religion was central to US operations in this enterprise, at the same time that a perceived lack of knowledge in US response bolsters the calls for ever-increasing knowledge attainment (as per Downie and Cooke’s previously quoted assertion that, ‘the upheavals in North Africa since the beginning of 2011 underline the dangers of ignoring these core grievances’89).

For the US security establishment culture is a tool not for peacekeeping or humanitarian efforts, but for ‘human terrain mapping’ and for resource and market protectionism. In 1961 former President Dwight D Eisenhower warned of the military–industrial complex. Since that moment the US military machine has operated to the material interests of a particular class of individuals who would have the academy serve those corporate interests

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as well. Academics are constrained by material needs and responsibilities – increasingly so under pressure to produce and publish as funding dries up – but there is an equilibrium between individual career and intellectual freedom. There is hope in our current moment. Given the role of the US security establishment and intelligence community in Africa in supporting anti-democratic leaders and in helping in the assassination or ousting of pro-people and populist leaders, many social scientists are increasingly troubled by the allocation of dod monies for social science research.90

The social science of freedom and self-respect depends upon a new engagement between scholars in Africa and the USA. This engagement requires not only challenging but dismantling the military-industrial complex, US national security reform and neo-imperial projects like the US Africa Command. This dismantling should be integrated as a central concern within the movement for an alternative social sciences, which increasingly calls for focus on the intersections of climate change, gender, alternative forms of economic organisation and people’s everyday material needs within an increasingly dehumanising and destructive neoliberal global colonial power matrix.

#### TK can’t end terrorism—evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan proves it fails against highly institutionalized groups.

Austin LONG, assistant professor at the School of International and Public Affairs and a Member of the Arnold A. Saltzman Institute of War and Peace Studies at Columbia University, former adviser with Coalition forces in Iraq (2007-8) and with Coalition forces in Afghanistan (2011-2013), 14 [“Whack-a-Mole or Coup de Grace? Institutionalization and Leadership Targeting in Iraq and Afghanistan,” *Security Studies*, Vol. 23, Issue 3, 2014, Accessed Online through Emory Libraries]

For the insurgent, organization is the sine qua non for survival, much less success. In both Anbar and Kandahar, loose organizations rapidly gave way to increasingly orderly, hierarchical, even bureaucratic, organizations. The available evidence clearly supports the primary hypothesis that well-institutionalized organizations that lose leaders will not lose cohesion. Institutionalization enabled AQI and the Taliban to retain cohesion despite continuous and substantial loss of leaders at all levels to the most massive and successful leadership targeting campaigns in history.

This conclusion helps clarify Jenna Jordan's findings on organizational age and size. While probabilistically speaking, older and larger organizations are more likely to be well institutionalized, neither is a prerequisite. Both the Taliban and AQI achieved robust institutionalization very rapidly and prior to major organizational growth. Indeed, institutionalization aided organizational expansion in the case of AQI, as its resistance to leadership targeting allowed it to absorb or co-opt other organizations. This supports Johnston's finding that organizational age per se has little to do with resisting leadership targeting. It also indicates that Price's characterization of the problems of institutionalization and leadership succession in these groups does not hold in some important cases.

This conclusion explicitly repudiates the hypothesis that insurgency in Iraq and Afghanistan has been fundamentally different in organization from traditional insurgency. The image of these insurgencies as very flat decentralized and networked organizations that are amorphous and fluid, with no central command, has gained the status of conventional wisdom. Yet AQI and the Taliban succeeded precisely because they were hierarchical and bureaucratic, traits that successful insurgents such as the Viet Cong would recognize. This is not to say the AQI and the Taliban have not availed themselves of modern technology and communications. Yet cellphones and computers did not substitute for formal organization, they merely enhanced it, as the radio enhanced Viet Cong organization.

Support for the secondary hypothesis, that the loss of mid-level leaders will not degrade the capability of well-institutionalized leaders, is strong but less compelling than that supporting the primary hypothesis. AQI continued to gain capability even as it lost mid-level leaders on a large scale through 2007, which supports the hypothesis. The subsequent decline in AQI capability is attributed to a variety of factors beyond leadership targeting so it is difficult to judge the effect of leadership targeting after 2007. The Taliban in Kandahar has likewise not suffered a substantial decline in capability despite losing many mid-level leaders.

The evidence presented also demonstrates the importance of institutionalization for anti-insurgent forces. All of the poorly institutionalized anti-insurgent organizations examined in both Iraq and Afghanistan proved susceptible to leadership targeting. Only extensive efforts to protect the leadership of these organizations combined with at least initiating institutionalization has enabled any of them to survive the insurgents’ leadership targeting. The Iraqi and Afghan police, despite highly varied capability, have nonetheless remained cohesive (though not always capable) despite the loss of leaders at all levels.

The importance of organizational characteristics such as functional specialization, bureaucracy, standard operating procedure, and hierarchy should come as no surprise to military officers or social scientists. Military organizations and industrial manufacturers both have these characteristics for a reason—they allow for the efficient production of goods, be it military force or microchips. This is no different for insurgent organizations, though the fact that they are clandestine organizations adds additional difficulties and can also conceal the degree to which they are organized.

Note that hierarchy and chain of command does not equate to total lack of autonomy for subordinates. Indeed, many effective military organizations give substantial autonomy to subordinates through what are termed “mission type” orders. This does not indicate lack of central guidance or strategy; rather it enables strategy by giving flexibility in tactical decisions to those best able to make those decisions: the commanders in the field.

The foregoing discussion does not fully answer the question of endogeneity of institutionalization. The available evidence rules out some variables as endogenous sources of institutionalization such as preexisting social networks or religious motivation. Yet the question of why AQI and the Taliban were able to effectively institutionalize so rapidly remains unclear and should be explored in future work.

For policymakers, the evidence from Iraq and Afghanistan offers some lessons. First, the foregoing does not mean that leadership targeting has no effect on well-institutionalized organizations. It is still disruptive at a minimum as even the effective replacement of leaders is not instantaneous. Moreover, leaders are not totally interchangeable; some are simply better than others. Furthermore, leadership targeting also exerts a suppressive effect on leaders, as they must undertake extensive security measures to avoid being targeted. Alex Wilner's research highlights other potential effects of leadership targeting on insurgent/terrorist activity, such as causing insurgents to shift from difficult “hardened” targets to easier “soft” targets.143

Yet these are tactical and operational rather than strategic effects. In terms of President Barack Obama's declared goal of “disrupting, dismantling, and defeating” al Qaeda, leadership targeting, whether carried out by special operations forces in Afghanistan or drones in Pakistan, can create disruption and temporary dismantling but it cannot defeat the organization, contrary to Secretary Panetta's assertion. Likewise in Iraq, leadership targeting does not appear to have been “a major, even indispensable, catalyst for success” as some advocates claim.144

This in turn suggests that expectations and resource allocation should be managed with an eye to the institutionalization of both hostile and allied organizations. If confronted by poorly institutionalized insurgent organizations, leadership targeting can have a substantial effect and should be resourced accordingly. However, dedicating massive resources to leadership targeting of well-institutionalized groups, while under-resourcing efforts to protect and institutionalize useful anti-insurgent organizations, appears suboptimal.

Additionally, while US leadership targeting is not indiscriminate, there are still mistakes. In Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan, individuals have been targeted incorrectly while even accurate targeting can produce collateral damage. These mistakes often produce backlash among the relevant population and/or its political leadership.145 While this is not a reason to completely abandon leadership targeting, policymakers should evaluate whether the likely gains from targeting an organization's leaders will be sufficiently effective to outweigh these costs.